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Abstract
With the development of more types of devices which have bluetooth as a pri-
mary option to communicate, the importance of secure communication is growing.
Bluetooth provides a short range wireless communication between devices making
convenient for users and thus eliminating the need for messy cables.
The proliferation of the Bluetooth devices in the workplace exposes organiza-
tions to security risks. Bluetooth technology and associated devices are susceptible
to general wireless networking threats, such as denial of service attack,eavesdropping,
man-in-the-middle attacks, message modification, and resource misappropriation.
Preventing unauthorized users from secure communication is a challenge to the
pairing process.
The Man-in-the-Middle attack is based on sending random signals to jam the
physical layer of legitimate user and then by falsification of information sent dur-
ing the input/output capabilities exchange; also the fact that the security of the
protocol is likely to be limited by the capabilities of the least powerful or the
least secure device type. In addition, proposed a countermeasure that render the
attack impractical. We have shown that, the proposed method can withstand the
MITM attack and achieving all the security needs like authenticity, confidentiality,
integrity and availability as well as it is an improvement to the existing Bluetooth
secure simple pairing in order to make it more secure.
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Introduction
Bluetooth is a technology for short range wireless data and real time two-way
audio/video transfer providing data rates up to 24 Mbps. It operates at 2.4 GHz
frequency in the free Industrial, Scientific, and Medical (ISM) band. Bluetooth de-
vices that communicate with each other form a piconet. The device that initiates
a connection is the piconet master and all other devices within that piconet are
slaves. The radio frequency (RF) waves can penetrate obstacles, because of this
reason the use of wireless communication systems have grown rapidly in recent
years. The wireless devices can communicate with no direct line-of-sight between
them. This makes RF communication easier to use than wired or infrared commu-
nication, but it also makes eavesdropping easier. Moreover, it is easier to disrupt
and jam wireless RF communication than wired communication. Because wireless
RF communication can suffer from these threats, additional countermeasures are
needed to protect against them.
1.1 Bluetooth Security
The basic Bluetooth security configuration is done by the user who decides how
a Bluetooth device will implement its connectability and discoverability options.
The different combinations of connectability and discoverability capabilities can
be divided into three categories, or security levels [1]:
• Public: The device can be both discovered and connected to. It is therefore
called a discoverable device.
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• Private: The device cannot be discovered, i.e., it is a so-called non-discoverab-
le device. Connections will be accepted only if the Bluetooth Device Address
(BD ADDR) is known to the prospective master. A 48 bit BD ADDR is
normally unique and refers globally to only one individual Bluetooth device.
• Silent: The device will never accept any connections. It simply monitors
Bluetooth traffic.
In Bluetooth versions up to 2.0+EDR, pairing is based exclusively on the fact that
both devices share the same Personal Identification Number (PIN) or passkey. As
the PINs often contain only four decimal digits, the strength of the resulting keys
is not enough for protection against passive eavesdropping on communication.
It has been shown that Man-in-the-Middle attack (MITM) attacks on Bluetooth
communications (versions up to 2.0+EDR) can be performed [1–5]. Bluetooth
versions 2.1+EDR (Enhanced Data Rate) and 3.0+HS (High Speed) add a new
specification for the pairing procedure, namely Secure Simple Pairing (SSP) [1].
Its main goal is to improve the security of pairing by providing protection against
passive eavesdropping and MITM attacks. Instead of using (often short) passkeys
as the only source of entropy for building the link keys, SSP employs Elliptic
Curve Diffie-Hellman public-key cryptography. To construct the link key, devices
use public-private key pairs, a number of nonces, and Bluetooth addresses of the
devices. Passive eavesdropping is effectively thwarted by SSP, as running an ex-
haustive search on a private key with approximately 95 bits of entropy is currently
considered to be infeasible in short time. In order to provide protection against
MITM attacks, SSP either asks for user’s help or uses an Out-Of-Band (OOB)
channel. The SSP uses four association models named Numerical Comparison
(NC), Passkey Entry (PE), Just Works (JW) and OOB.
• Numerical Comparison: It was designed for the situation where both
Bluetooth devices are capable of displaying a 6-digit number and allowing
a user to enter a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ response. During pairing, a user is shown a
6-digit number on each display and provides a ‘yes’ response on each device
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if the numbers match. Otherwise, the user responds ‘no’ and pairing will
fail.
• Passkey Entry: It was designed for the situation where one Bluetooth
device has input capability (e.g., Bluetooth-enabled keyboard), while the
other device has a display but no input capability. In this model, the device
with only a display shows a 6-digit number that the user then enters on the
device with input capability.
• Just Works: It was designed for the situation where one (or both) of the
pairing devices has neither a display nor a keyboard for entering digits (e.g.,
Bluetooth-enabled headset). The user is required to accept a connection
without verifying the calculated value on both devices, so MITM protection
is not provided.
• Out-Of-Band: It was designed for devices that support a wireless tech-
nology other than Bluetooth e.g., Near Field Communication (NFC) for the
purposes of device discovery and cryptographic value exchange. It is impor-
tant to note that the chosen OOB wireless technology should be configured
to mitigate eavesdropping and MITM attacks to keep the pairing process as
secure as possible.
Figure 1.1 shows the Bluetooth SSP with NC method. The six phases of SSP are
explained below:
• Capabilities Exchange: The devices that have never met before or want
to perform re-pairing for some reason, first exchange their Input/Output
(IO) capabilities to determine the proper association model to be used.
• Public Key Exchange: The devices generate their public-private key pairs
and send the public keys to each other. They also compute the Diffie-
Hellman key.
• Authentication Stage-1: The protocol that is run at this stage depends on
the association model. One of the goals of this stage is to ensure that there
4
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Initiating 
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Figure 1.1: Bluetooth Secure Simple Pairing with Numerical Comparison
is no MITM in the communication between the devices. This is achieved by
using a series of nonces, commitments to the nonces, and a final check of
integrity checksums performed either through the OOB channel or with the
help of user.
• Authentication Stage-2: The devices complete the exchange of values
(public keys and nonces) and verify the integrity of them.
• Link Key Calculation: The parties compute the link key using their
Bluetooth addresses, the previously exchanged values and the Diffie-Hellman
key constructed in public key exchange phase.
• Link Management Protocol Authentication and Encryption: En-
cryption keys are generated in this phase, which is the same as the final
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steps of pairing in Bluetooth versions up to 2.0+EDR.
1.2 Why Bluetooth Security is Needed?
These days Bluetooth security is a big issue, all communication technology faces
the problem of privacy and identity theft, with Bluetooth being no exception.
The information and data we share through these communication technologies is
both private and in many cases, critically important to us. So we can say that,
providing security for bluetooth communication is very very important.
1.3 Bluetooth Security Modes
Cumulatively, the four security modes defined by various versions of Bluetooth
specifications. Each version of Bluetooth supports not all, but some, of the four
modes. Each Bluetooth device must operate in one of the four modes, which are
described below [6].
• Mode 1 : Security Mode 1 is non-secure. The basic security function-
alities authentication and encryption are bypassed, leaving the device and
connections susceptible to attackers. In effect, Bluetooth devices in this
mode are promiscuous and do not employ any mechanisms to prevent other
Bluetooth-enabled devices from establishing connections. Security Mode 1
is only supported in v2.0 + EDR (and earlier) devices.
• Mode 2 : In Security Mode 2, a service level-enforced security mode, secu-
rity procedures are initiated after LMP link establishment but before L2CAP
channel establishment. L2CAP resides in the data link layer and provides
connection-oriented and connectionless data services to upper layers. In this
mode, the notion of authorization–the process of deciding if a specific device
is allowed to have access to a specific service–is introduced. All Bluetooth
devices can support Security Mode 2; however, v2.1 + EDR devices can only
support it for backward compatibility with v2.0 + EDR (or earlier) devices.
• Mode 3 : In Security Mode 3, the link level-enforced security mode, a Blue-
tooth device initiates security procedures before the physical link is fully
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established. Bluetooth devices operating in Security Mode 3 mandates au-
thentication and encryption for all connections to and from the device. The
authentication and encryption features are based on a separate secret link
key that is shared by paired devices, once the pairing has been established.
Security Mode 3 is only supported in v2.0 + EDR (or earlier) devices.
• Mode 4 : Similar to Security Mode 2, Security Mode 4 (introduced in
Bluetooth v2.1 + EDR) is a service level enforced security mode in which
security procedures are initiated after link setup. SSP uses Elliptic Curve
Diffie Hellman (ECDH) techniques for key exchange and link key genera-
tion. Security requirements for services protected by Security Mode 4 must
be classified as one of the following: authenticated link key required, unau-
thenticated link key required, or no security required. Whether or not a
link key is authenticated depends on the Secure Simple Pairing association
model used.
1.4 Motivation
After the literature survey, it is found that MITM attacks are becoming the main
problem in Bluetooth area networks. The MITM nodes are behaving like the
original nodes and they can send/receive the valuable data. These MITM nodes
can modify the data between the source and destination also. The attacks are
based on the falsification of information sent during the input/output capabilities
exchange and also the fact that the security of the protocol is likely to be limited
by the capabilities of the least powerful or the least secure device type. The
motivation is to achieve the solution for avoiding the MITM attacks in secure
sample pairing method.
1.5 Problem Statement
The MITM first disrupts (jams) the physical layer (PHY) by hopping along with
the victim devices and sending random data in every time slot. In this way,
the MITM shuts down all piconets within the range of susceptibility and there
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is no need to use a Bluetooth chipset to generate hopping patterns. Finally, a
frustrated user thinks that something is wrong with his/her Bluetooth devices
and deletes previously stored link keys. After that the user initiates a new pairing
process by using SSP, and the MITM can forge messages exchanged during the
IO capabilities exchange phase. While using the SSP also, the MITM attacks are
going to be possible by using the PHY jamming and falsification of information.
The Figure 1.2 shows the problem of MITM attacks on physical layer of Bluetooth
devices.
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NonͲInitiating
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ConnecttoB
ConnecttoB
ConnecttoA
ConnecttoA
ConnecttoA
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PairingComplete PairingComplete
Figure 1.2: MITM Attack on Bluetooth SSP with JW Association
1.6 Thesis Organization
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. The Bluetooth attacks and threats are
summarized in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 provides existing countermeasures against all
attacks and proposed countermeasure against MITM attack. Chapter 4 provides
the concluding remarks.
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Chapter 2
Bluetooth Attacks and Threats
Classification of threats can assist in finding threat severity, precautions, and its
countermeasures. A Bluetooth Threat Taxonomy (Aboott) provides a framework
for satisfying all threats. Abott consists of nine distinct classes [7] . Specif-
ically, the Aboott classifications are surveillance, range extension, obfuscation,
fuzzer, sniffing, denial of service (DoS), malware, unauthorized direct data ac-
cess (UDDA), and MITM. Each attack appears in only one classification, based
on its predominant characteristic, although a single attack can fall under several
classifications.
2.1 Surveillance Attacks
Surveillance is an attack which is used to gather the information from the Blue-
tooth devices. These surveillance tools never cause the adverse effects to the tar-
get devices [7]. The threats under surveillance attacks are Blueprinting, bt audit,
Redfang, War-nibbling, Bluefish, Sdptool, BlueScanner and BTScanner.
2.1.1 Blueprinting
Blueprinting is designed for device fingerprinting. It uses the available services,
device address, and other information to profile the interface, device, and host
operating system. Attackers can use this service information to profile the device
and get information on potential vulnerable vectors.
10
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2.1.2 bt audit
bt audit scans all Protocol Service Multiplexers (PSMs) and RF Communication
channels to determine if a target device has any undisclosed ports that could
potentially lead to the discovery of unsecured services.
2.1.3 Redfang
Devices in non discoverable mode should be invisible, but according to promi-
nent Bluetooth researcher Ollie Whitehouse of IT consultancy, that’s not the
case. Whitehouse has designed a software tool called RedFang that can discover
Bluetooth devices that have been set to be non discoverable. He also says, Red-
Fang tries to “brute-force the entire Bluetooth address space asking for a device’s
name”,and if a legitimate name is found, even devices in nondiscoverable mode
can be seen. Once the devices are discovered, they become exposed to threats
such as bluesnarfing [8].
2.1.4 War-nibbling
War-nibbling can search the Bluetooth enabled devices in a particular location.
By using this, the attacker can know all the profiles of the Bluetooth enabled
devices in a particular area.
2.1.5 Bluefish
Bluefish takes surveillance of Bluetooth devices one step further. When a Bluefish
system detects a new device, it records the Bluetooth device information and
takes a photograph in the distrusted direction of the device. Each time the device
reenters the range of the Bluefish running computer, the process is repeated.
2.1.6 Sdptool
Sdptool is a Service Discovery Protocol (SDP) tool, which provides the interface
for performing SDP queries on Bluetooth devices, and administering a local sdp
daemon [9].
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2.1.7 BlueScanner
BlueScanner is designed for easy to use. Simply press a button when scanning a
bar code. The scanned bar codes can be either send to an SMS gateway or send to
an application running on the Mobile Equipment (ME) itself. BlueScanner uses
Bluetooth technology for connecting with an ME like a mobile phone. BlueScan-
ner supports service level security in Bluetooth connectivity, multiple operating
modes, and audio-visual indications for the status of the BlueScanner [10].
2.1.8 BTScanner
BTScanner is designed to extract information from a Bluetooth device without
having to pair with it, meaning that it operates noninvasively and therefore, invis-
ibly. Hurman notes that the current version of btscanner can only find informa-
tion about discoverable devices (such as channel information and a list of services
running); but if those devices are discovered using Redfang, for example, then
btscanner can learn enough about them to provide a potential weak point to a
determined attacker [8].
2.2 Range Extension Attacks
The range of any wireless device will be limited to some extent. Extending a
device’s range might be against US Federal Communication Commission (FCC)
rules, but attackers can use it to conduct attacks from a distance [7]. The threats
under range extension threats are BlueSniping, Bluetooone and VERA-NG.
2.2.1 BlueSniping
BlueSniping is the term given to somebody who uses a high gain aerial connected
to a computer to steal information from a bluetooth device. It is rarely found
due to the nature of the equipment, but was first found to exist in Sweden [11].
BlueSniping has emerged as a method for BlueSnarfing, or simply identifying
Bluetooth-enabled devices, at longer ranges than normally possible. [12].
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2.2.2 Bluetooone
Bluetooone is the method involves attaching a high-gain antenna to the standard
Bluetooth radio to extend ranges from meters to kilometers.
2.2.3 VERA-NG
The Very Eccentric Radio frequency Antenna - Nerf Gun (VERA-NG) combines
the greatness of Nerf gun office antics with high-gain wireless auditing technology.
VERA-NG is built on a Nerf Long shot CS-6, which has been equipped with
two antennas (high-gain antennas made from Pringles cans) attached to both
Bluetooth and Wi-Fi USB adapters. This allows for auditing of these wireless
technologies from a discrete distance. VERA-NG also includes an ultra portable
tablet and GPS. It is well equipped for long range wireless sniffing, mapping an
area for Bluetooth and Wi-Fi devices, and shooting Nerf darts long range [13].
2.3 Obfuscation Attacks
Attackers can use obfuscation to achieve a level of anonymity for launching an
attack [7]. The threats under Obfuscation threats are Bdaddr, Hciconfig and
Spooftooph.
2.3.1 Bdaddr
By modifying the Bluetooth interface’s firmware, the bdaddr can change addresses
of the devices on certain Bluetooth chipsets. By permanently resetting the inter-
face device address, bdaddr nullifies the assumption of the device address as a
unique identifier.
2.3.2 Hciconfig
By using Hciconfig application, the users can change most of its publicly provided
Bluetooth information, including their class and name. If we use this in combi-
nation with bdaddr, hciconfig lets attackers clone device addresses, names, and
classes, hereby letting a laptop mask itself as a cell phone, automobile, mobile
headset, and so on.
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2.3.3 Spooftooph
Spooftooph simplifies the process by automatically scanning for devices in range
and cloning their Bluetooth device information according to the user’s selection.
2.4 Fuzzer Attacks
Fuzzing is a technique used to test application input handling. Fuzzers operate by
submitting nonstandard input to an application to achieve malicious results. The
threats under Fuzzer threats are BluePass, Bluetooth Stack Smasher, BlueSmack,
Tanya and BlueStab [7].
2.4.1 BluePass and Bluetooth Stack Smasher
These are tools for assembling and sending packets to a target device. They help
craft packets that test an application’s ability to handle standard and nonstandard
input data.
2.4.2 BlueSmack
BlueSmack uses a Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol (L2CAP) echo
request, similar to an Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) ping. An at-
tacker can abuse the echo request by changing its size to 600 bytes or greater.
2.4.3 Tanya
The Tanya exploit tool crafts and sends maliciously formed L2CAP quality of
service messages to degrade Bluetooth service on a mobile device. The tool re-
peatedly sends the same maliciously crafted message to a target device and limits
the throughput of the vulnerable device by forcing the device to continuously re-
spond. Similar tools include BlueSmack and Symbian Remote Restart; both which
take advantage of the L2CAP quality of service messages to overwhelm vulnerable
devices [14].
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2.4.4 BlueStab
BlueStab uses bad names to crash devices engaged in Bluetooth discovery address
[15].
2.5 Sniffing Attacks
Sniffing is just like eavesdropping on a phone line, the process of capturing traffic
in transit. Because Bluetooth broadcasts traffic wirelessly over RF, it’s vulnerable
to outside monitoring on specific frequencies [7]. The types of sniffers are FTS4BT,
Merlin, BlueSniff, HCIDump, Wireshark and Kismet.
2.5.1 FTS4BT and Merlin
These are the two commercially available Bluetooth sniffers. These tools combine
specialized hardware and software to monitor Bluetooth traffic by matching the
connection’s frequency hops and then capturing data in that frequency range.
They log the sniffed data to a local file, which users can later view and analyze.
2.5.2 BlueSniff
Bluetooth uses frequency hopping over 79 channels in order to minimize interfer-
ence and (usually) hops once every 625s, sending one packet per channel. The
hopping sequence is determined by the MAC address of the master device and
its clock. The master device is the one that initiates the connection, and the
slave being the one connected to [16]. BlueSniff is the process of using a modi-
fied Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP2) motherboard to monitor all 79
channels at the same time. It monitors each channel’s traffic as binary data and
reassembles the data into standard Bluetooth traffic for further analysis [7].
2.5.3 HCIDump
This is a utility that can capture and read raw Bluetooth traffic by monitoring
local Bluetooth interfaces and capturing data from sniffed traffic. This tool assists
attackers in discovering weaknesses in protocols and services.
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2.5.4 Wireshark
Wireshark is also a powerful wireless security analysis tool. UsingWireshark™displ-
ay filtering and protocol decoders, it can easily shift through large amounts of
wireless traffic to identify security vulnerabilities in the wireless network, includ-
ing weak encryption or authentication mechanisms, and information disclosure
risks.It can also perform intrusion detection analysis to identify common attacks
against wireless networks while performing signal strength analysis to identify the
location of a station or access point (AP) [17].
2.5.5 Kismet
Kismet is a computer program that allows for passive detection of wireless local
area network. It enables sniffing and has some features of Intrusion Detection
Schemes (IDS) for 802.11 networks. Kismet works with any Wi-Fi cards, but card
must support monitor mode. Kismet allows you to capture frames, the second
layer of 802.11b, 802.11a and 802.11g [18].
2.6 DoS Attacks
This is an attack on making the services unavailable. These attacks often target
communication channels, but they can relate to any service the device uses, in-
cluding the processor, memory, disk space, battery life, and system availability [7].
The threats under DoS threats are battery exhaustion, signal jamming, BlueSYN,
Blueper, BlueJacking and vCardBlaster.
2.6.1 Battery Exhaustion
In battery exhaustion attack, the attacker keeps on sending some unnecessary data
to the legitimate users; For receiving those data packets the devices lose their total
energy.
2.6.2 Signal Jamming
In signal jamming attack, the attacker can send the signal to the legitimate devices,
at the same time of signal transmission to them. So, by doing this, the jammer’s
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signal and the legitimate user’s signal will present in collision and the signal will
not be transmitted. The legitimated users think that, there may be a network jam
but it is not the real network jam. There are four types jammers [19, 20]. They
are,
• Constant Jammer: A jammer continually emits radio signals on the wire-
less medium. The signals can consist of a completely random sequence of
bits.
• Deceptive Jammer: It is similar to the constant jammer. Their similarity
is due to the fact that both constantly transmit bits. The main difference is
that with the deceptive jammer, the transmitted bits are not random. The
deceptive jammer continually injects regular packets on the channel without
any gaps between the transmissions.
• Random Jammer: An attacker employing random jamming, jams for tj
seconds and then sleeps for ts seconds. During the jamming intervals, this
jammer can follow any of the approaches of other jammers.
• Reactive Jammer: This jammer is constantly senses the channel and upon
sensing a packet transmission, immediately transmits a radio signal in order
to cause a collision at the receiver.
2.6.3 BlueSYN
Simultaneously attacking the device with a hping2 SYN flood, affecting the Wi-
Fi interface, and a l2ping BlueSmack flood, affecting the Bluetooth interface,
demonstrates a blended attack that attempts to saturate multiple communication
vectors. The SYN flood propagated through a wired LAN to an access point
before finding the target device, while the Bluetooth portion of the attack was
launched from a Bluetooth adapter on the notebook computer directly against the
targeted device. This previously undocumented attack was named the BlueSYN
DoS Attack [21].
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2.6.4 Blueper
Blueper is designed for mobile devices to abuse Bluetooth file transfer. It floods
the target with file transfer requests. This tool sends continuous stream of pop-up
messages for file transfer requests to the target. A more detrimental result is data
written to a target device disk without user interaction or previous authentication,
causing some devices to temporarily halt execution or crash.
2.6.5 BlueJacking
Bluejacking is usually harmless, but because blueJacked people generally don’t
know what has happened, they may think that their phone is malfunctioning.
Usually, a blueJacker will only send a text message, but with modern phones it’s
possible to send images or sounds as well. With the increase in the availability of
Bluetooth enabled devices, it is often reported that devices have become vulnerable
to virus attacks and even complete take over of devices through a trojan horse
program although most of these reports are easily debunked. Bluejacking is also
confused with Bluesnarfing which is the way in which mobile phones are illegally
hacked via Bluetooth [22]. Bluejacking is a technique for abusing the vCard feature
on mobile phones.
2.6.6 vCardBlaster
By accepting vCards often requires no interaction on the receiver’s end, opening
a way for attackers to send anonymous messages without any credentials. The
attack can be used to frighten users with suspicious-looking messages on their
mobile devices.
2.7 Malware Attacks
Malware is a malicious form of software, often self replicating, that carries out
various activities such as data mining, accessing personal files, password theft,
file corruption, and system reconfiguration. Commonly known Malware subsets
include viruses, worms, and Trojan horses [7]. The threats under Malware threats
are BlueBag, Caribe and CommWarrior.
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2.7.1 BlueBag
This vulnerability permits access to the cell phone’s set of AT commands, which
let an aggressor use the phone’s services, including placing outgoing calls, sending,
receiving, or deleting Short Message Service (SMS), diverting calls, and so on [23].
2.7.2 Caribe and CommWarrior
By using these two, the worms propagate though Bluetooth communication, in-
fecting cell phones running Symbian OS. The user of targeted device receives a
message to accept the incoming file. Based on the worm file type, once down-
loaded, the worm can bypass the normal user prompt for execution, installs itself
in hidden directories on the host device, and set itself to autorun. It then begins
to search for Bluetooth devices in range and propagates itself.
2.8 UDDA Attacks
UDDA attacks gather private information for unauthorized entities by penetrating
devices through loopholes in security, allowing unauthorized access to privileged
information [7]. The threats under UDDA attacks are Bloover, BlueSnarf, Blue-
Bug, BlueSnarf++,BTCrack, btpincrack, Car Whisperer and HeloMoto.
2.8.1 Bloover
. Bloover is a tool which can launch an attack on mobile phones for reading phone
books, writing phone book entries, reading or decoding the SMS stored on the
device, setting call forward to a particular number and also initializing phone call.
These are the services provided by the Bloover tool. This tool is not working well
in Nokia phones [24].
2.8.2 BlueSnarf
This type of attack uses the OBEX (OBject EXchange) push service, which is com-
monly used to exchange files such as business cards. BlueSnarf allows an attacker
to access the vulnerable device’s phone book and calendar without authentication.
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A recently upgraded version of this attack gives the attacker full read and write
access [23].
2.8.3 BlueBug and BlueSnarf++
These facilitates unauthorized access to certain cell phone models, letting attack-
ers view contacts, text messages, pictures, call records, and so on. They can also
send a command to a victim device on a covert channel, thus avoiding user detec-
tion. UDDA attacks also use phone features such as short message service (SMS),
Internet connection, and telephony to gain complete control of a device through
its Bluetooth connection. The attacker is then free to place phone calls, copy
contact lists, and reconfigure call forwarding.
2.8.4 BTCrack and btpincrack
These tools uses a brute-force method to crack the PIN. They capture packets in
the pairing process and compare them with attacker-crafted packet parameters,
which they generate by enumerating PINs for encrypting standard packet content.
The time it takes to break a PIN is directly proportional to its length.
2.8.5 Car Whisperer
Car Whisperer automates the access to Bluetooth-enabled devices with default
settings by guessing the default PIN. Once connected, the attacker can extract
audio from or inject it into the target device.
2.8.6 HeloMoto
HeloMoto is a combination of BlueSnarf and BlueBag. The name of attack comes
from the fact that it was originally discovered on Motorola phones [23].
2.9 MITM Attacks
MITM attacks place an attacking device between two connected devices to act as
a relay (the attacker uses obfuscation to hide the attacking device). Previously
paired devices send their information to the attacking device, which then relays
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it to its intended destination [7]. The threats under MITM attacks are BT-SSP-
Printer-MITM, BlueSpooof and bthidproxy.
2.9.1 BT-SSP-Printer-MITM
The BT-SSP-Printer-MITM attack shows possible vulnerabilities in the newer
Bluetooth standards. This attack focuses on the JW connection option in four
association models of SSP, which lets devices pair without authentication. The
BT-SSP-Printer-MITM attack sets the attacker’s device as a relay point between
the user’s device and a printer. When the user device connects to the printer using
the JW method, the attacker breaks the connection by using some form of DoS.
2.9.2 BlueSpooof
By BlueSpooof tool, The attacker can act as another Bluetooth device by using
its BT address [15].
2.9.3 Bthidproxy
Bthidproxy is yet another handy piece of software. Using it MITM attack can
be possible on Bluetooth connections by using two dongles and spoofing the host
and device addresses. Because of virtual cabling, a one to one connection is made
between device and host. This means that almost all attacks must be performed
when either the device or host are off allowing anyone to take their place. This
is not too much of a problem since machines get powered down often and many
mice have off switches to save battery [25].
2.9.4 History of MITM Attacks
The First MITM attack on Bluetooth assumes that the link key used by two
victim devices is known to the attacker was devised by Jakobsson and Wetzel [2].
This attack works for the version 1.0B and as well as all versions upto 2.0+EDR,
because of no security improvements were implemented in those specifications.
The authors also showed how to obtain the link key using oﬄine PIN crunching,
by passive eavesdropping on the initialization key establishment protocol.
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By manipulating with the clock settings, the attacker forces both victim de-
vices to use the same channel hopping sequence but different clocks. This is an
improvement of the attack of [2] by Kugler [3]. In addition, Kugler shows how a
MITM attack can be performed during the paging procedure. The attacker re-
sponds to the page request of the master victim faster than the slave victim, and
restarts the paging procedure with the slave using a different clock.
Reflection (relay) attacks [4] aim at impersonating the victim devices. The
attacker does not need to know any secret information, because she only relays
(reflects) the received information from one victim device to another during the
authentication.
The versions 2.1+EDR and 3.0+HS of Bluetooth provide protection against
the MITM attacks described above, by the means of SSP. However, it has been
shown that MITM attacks against Bluetooth 2.1+EDR and 3.0+HS devices are
also possible [5,26–29]. Because SSP supports several association models, selection
of which depends on the capabilities of the target devices, the attacker can force the
devices into the use of a less secure mode by changing the capabilities information.
Haataja and Toivanen [1] proposed two new MITM attacks on Bluetooth SSP.
The first attack is based on the falsification of information sent during the IO ca-
pabilities exchange. The second attack requires some kind of visual contact to the
victim devices in order to mislead the user to select a less secure option instead of
using a more secure OOB channel. Now the situation has been changed— Blue-
tooth devices with an adjustable Bluetooth device addresses are readily available
and techniques for finding hidden (non-discoverable) Bluetooth devices have been
invented. Therefore, the danger of MITM attacks has recently increased.
Table 2.1 shows the Bluetooth connection methods and the possibility of the
MITM attacks on those methods.
MITM attacks can be possible on these Bluetooth connection methods— (i)
SSP with just works, (ii) if one of the devices does not have IO devices or the MITM
impersonates as legitimate user and tells no-input and no-output as its capabilities
to connect and (iii) by creating Jam in PHY when legitimate users know each
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Table 2.1: The Bluetooth connection methods and possibility of the MITM attacks
Sl.
No.
Bluetooth Connection Methods Possibility
of MITM
Attacks
1 SSP with Just Works YES
2 SSP-OOB as mandatory NO
3 SSP- Numeric comparison with both devices have IO capabil-
ities.
NO
4 One of the devices does not have IO devices or the MITM
impersonates as legitimate user and tells “no-input and no-
output” as its capabilities to connect.
YES
5 By creating Jam in PHY when legitimate users know each
other.
YES
6 By using RF fingerprints as Keys NO
7 By Adding an additional window at the user interface level NO
other. The Solutions to the above methods are— (i) by not allowing the devices
for the JW option association model (the users should have key sharing) OR by
allowing the devices by adding an additional window at the user interface level,
(ii) OOB as a mandatory association model (i.e., the communication will be very
secure by using near field communication like infrared) and (iii) by using one of
Anti-Jamming techniques like frequency hopping, direct sequence spread spectrum
and uncoordinated spread spectrum. The various jammers used for jamming the
physical layers of Bluetooth devices are— constant jammer, deceptive jammer,
random jammer, reactive jammer [19,20]. Possible solutions to the attacks which
are presented in Table 2.1 are given in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: The possible solutions to the attacks which are presented in Table 1
Sl.
No.
Problems Solutions
1 SSP with Just Works By not allowing the devices for the
JW option association model (the users
should have key sharing) OR by allow-
ing the devices by adding an additional
window at the user interface level.
2 One of the devices don’t have IO
devices OR The MITM imper-
sonates as legitimate user and
tells “no-input and no-output”
as its capabilities to connect
OOB as a mandatory association model
(i.e., the communication will be very se-
cure by using near field communication
like infrared)
3 By creating Jam in PHY when
legitimate users know each other
By using one of Anti-Jamming tech-
niques like frequency hopping, direct
sequence spread spectrum and uncoor-
dinated spread spectrum
23
2.10 Summary
2.10 Summary
In this chapter, all kinds of the attacks and threats have been seen which can be
possible to attack on devices having Bluetooth connectivity.
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Summary
Chapter 3
Countermeasures
A countermeasure is a measure or action taken to counter or offset another one. As
a general concept it implies precision, and is any technological or tactical solution
or system (often for a military application) designed to prevent an undesirable
outcome in the process. To improve the security of the Bluetooth communication,
we need to follow some countermeasures. The set of countermeasures are classified
into three categories. They are for user, manufacturer and specification [7].
3.1 For User
There are 14 different countermeasures which have to follow by the user to avoid
maximum number of the attacks discussed in the Chapter 2. The countermeasures
are listed below [7].
3.1.1 Disabling Bluetooth when not in use
Bluetooth is often used for short-term inter device connections. When not in
use, the best defense against attacks is to disable Bluetooth through hardware or
software controls.
3.1.2 Disabling unused services
Many systems let users specify which services to enable/disable. For example,
users might want to enable the audio gateway on a mobile phone but disable file
transfer.
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3.1.3 Placing Bluetooth devices in non-discoverable mode
when not pairing
A device should only be discoverable during initial pairing. Afterwords, devices
will be able to locate each other without being in discoverable mode. Devices in
non-discoverable mode are much more difficult for an attacker to find.
3.1.4 Placing Bluetooth devices in security mode 2, 3, or
4, requiring authentication and encryption for com-
munication
This often involves selecting a setting option such as “enable encryption” or “au-
thentication required”. These settings help prevent connection from unauthorized
devices and make it more difficult to extract data from sniffed traffic.
3.1.5 Avoiding using JW
The JW association model doesn’t protect against MITM attacks. It also facili-
tates device connections without any form of authentication.
3.1.6 Use alphanumeric PINs, 12 digits or greater in length
This helps prevent brute-force password guessing and makes it almost impossible
for attackers to extract the password from cracking attempts on sniffed traffic.
3.1.7 Never accepting files or messages from untrusted de-
vices
Files and messages can carry attacks against a device. Attackers can easily spoof
the device name, so it’s best to use a second factor of verification, such as a verbal
conversation, before accepting a connection.
3.1.8 Never accepting pairing with untrusted devices
So many services are available on Bluetooth that it can be difficult to determine
what users are agreeing to when a message is presented for action. Pairing is also
permanent unless partnerships are later deleted. Pairing with an untrusted device
can provide access to all Bluetooth services enabled on the local device.
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3.1.9 Changing PINs semi frequently
This is a good practice with any form of authentication. Most Bluetooth authen-
tication occurs just once, so changing PINs can help prevent previously trusted
devices from regaining access to a device without user notification.
3.1.10 Using an additional window at the user interface
level
It is recommended that an additional window, “The second device has no display
and keyboard! Is it true?” should be displayed at the user interface level of SSP
when the JW association model is to be used. Then the user is asked to choose
“PROCEED” or “STOP”.
3.1.11 SSP-OOB as mandatory
Future Bluetooth specifications should make OOB a mandatory association model
in order to radically improve the security and usability of SSP. Therefore, future
Bluetooth specifications should at least strongly recommend the use of an OOB
channel (e.g., NFC) to all Bluetooth device manufacturers.
3.1.12 Using RF fingerprints
There will be difference between the signals sent by the devices which are manu-
factured by the same company. so we can use the RF fingerprints can be used for
identification.
3.2 For Manufacturer
There are some countermeasures which should be followed by the manufacturer
instead of user. Because those are not able to done by the user. The countermea-
sures which need to follow by the manufacturer are listed bellow [7].
3.2.1 Making input validation a high priority during de-
velopment of Bluetooth related tools
This basic principle applies to all software development. Software relating to the
use of Bluetooth should be rigorously tested to prevent buffer overflows and illegal
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directory traversals.
3.2.2 Disabling all unnecessary Protocol Service Multi-
plexers (PSM) and RFComm channels
Closing all unused PSMs and RF Communication channels helps prevent attackers
from gaining access to standard device services and back doors left open from
testing.
3.2.3 Disregarding traffic not formatted to Bluetooth spec-
ification
By ignoring the traffic which is not in Bluetooth specification format, It can pre-
vent fuzzing and enforce the Bluetooth standards.
3.2.4 Testing all products with applicable hacking tools for
vulnerabilities
Using the tools such as those discussed in this article can help reveal vulnerabilities
during production before the product goes on the market.
3.3 For Specification
The countermeasures which need to follow by the manufacturer offers two-factor
authentication [7].
3.3.1 Offering two-factor authentication
As initial authentication often occurs only once, so second factor of authentication
is warranted for devices that might have multiple users or be at risk for theft. This
second form of authentication could be required for each pairing and/or service
use.
3.4 Proposed Countermeasure
The proposed approach is like that— while one of the initiating or non-initiating
devices is trying to connect with each other, the attacker sends wrong signals
which leads to the corruption of the original signal. So, the legitimate users think
that, there maybe some sort of genuine jam in the network or there may be some
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sort of jamming attack. Now instead of deleting all the information about the
previously connected devices, the legitimate user needs to run IDS. If there is
a presence of any jammer, then by running the IPS, It can be found a way to
avoid the jammer and there is no need to delete the keys. After that, the process
of SSP with NC association will be followed for the secure communication. The
Prevention schemes of PHY layer are also called anti-jamming techniques. The
algorithmic representation of the proposal is given in Algorithm 1. The Figure 3.1
shows the countermeasure against MITM attack. The algorithmic representation
of the process of SSP with NC association is given in Algorithm 2 and Algorithm
3.
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Figure 3.1: Countermeasure to MITM Attack
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Algorithm 1 Proposed Connection Establishment Algorithm between Users
REQUIRE Assumptions
Both the users Already Communicated Before
Both the Users Knows the Address of Each Others
Send Signals for Establishment of the Connection
if Basic Connection Established then
Run SSP with NC Association Algorithm
else
if Found Network Jamming then
Run IDS Schemes
if Found the Attacker then
Run IPS Schemes
Run SSP with NC Association Algorithm
else
Delete All Link Keys and Go for a Fresh Connection
end if
end if
end if
Algorithm 2 SSP with NC Association (Part 1)
REQUIRE Notations
p : large prime number
g : generator of order p-1
IOcapX : Input and Output capabilities of user X
SKx : Private Key of User X
DHKey : Diffie-Hellman Key
Nx : Nonce generated by the user X
rx : Random number generated by user X for this algorithm it is set to 0
Cx : Commitment value from user X
Vx : verification value from user X
fun1 : One-way function used to compute commitment
fun2 : One-way function used to compute numeric check values
fun3 : One-way function used to compute check values
LK : Link Key
BD ADDRx : 48-bit Bluetooth address of device X
Step1 :
userA : Send the IOcapA to userB
userB : Send the IOcapB to userA
UserAandB :
if both users have both input and output capabilities then
goto step 2
else
. For some reason we need to break here!
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Algorithm 3 SSP with NC Association (Part 2)
end the connection
end if
Step 2 :
UserA : enters a private key SKa
PKa= pow(g,SKa) mod p , send the PKa to userB
UserB : enters a private key SKb
PKb=pow(g,SKb) mod p , send the PKb to userA
UserA : DHKey = pow(PKb,SKa) mod p
UserB : DHKey= pow(PKa,SKb) mod p
Step 3 :
UserA : Generate a random number Na and set ra to 0, send Na to userB
UserB : Generate a random number Nb and set br to 0
Cb=fun1(PKb, PKa,Nb, 0) ,send Cb and Nb to userA
UserA :
if Cb == fun1(PKb, PKa,Nb, 0) then
V a = fun2(PKa, PKb,Na,Nb) , send V a to userB
end if
UserB : V b = fun2(Pka, Pkb,Na,Nb) , send V b to userA
UserAandB :
if V a == V b then
goto step 4
else
end the connection
end if
Step 4 :
UserA : Ea = fun3(DHKey,Na,Nb, 0, IOcapA,A,B) and send Ea to userB.
UserB : Eb = fun3(DHKey,Na,Nb, 0, IOcapB,B,A)
if Ea = fun3(DHKey,Na,Nb, 0, IOcapA,A,B) then
send Eb to userA
else
end the connection
end if
UserA :
if Eb = fun3(DHKey,Na,Nb, 0, IOcapB,B,A) then
goto step 5
else
end the connection
end if
Step 5 :
UserAandB : LK = fun4(DHKey,Na,Nb, “btlk′′, BDADDRa,BDADDRb)
Step 6 :
UserAandB : Use LK for encryption and decryption of data.
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3.4.1 Using Intrusion Detection Schemes
The traditional techniques of IDS of wired line networks are directly taken to
Bluetooth communication also. Table 3.1 shows the types of IDS. With these IDS
listed in Table 3.1, one can be able to detect all types of jammers and overcome
the problem of distinguishing between network dynamics and jamming attacks.
However, there are still open issues. For example, the frequency of the location
advertisements can significantly affect the performance of the location consistency
check system. In addition, wireless propagation effects (e.g., Fading) should be
taken into consideration for accurately computing the false alarm rate of the IDS.
Table 3.1: Discoverability of various jammers using different IDS
Sl.
No.
Intrusion Detection
Schemes [19,20,30]
Constant
Jammer
Deceptive
Jammer
Random
Jammer
Reactive
Jammer
1 Signal Strength Measure-
ments
Yes Yes No No
2 Carrier Sensing Time Yes Yes No No
3 Measuring the Packet De-
livery Ratio (PDR)*
Yes Yes Yes Yes
4 Consistency Checks** Yes Yes Yes Yes
* PDR measurements can not always distinguish between jamming and net-
work failures and/or poor link conditions.
** Consistency Checks introduce two detection techniques:
(a) Signal Strength Consistency Check
(b) Location Consistency Check
3.4.2 Intrusion Prevention Schemes
There are 5 schemes. The Simple PHY Layer Techniques ans Directional Antennas
do not perform any processing of the transmitted signal while, The rest of the
schemes perform processing of transmitted signal.
Simple PHY Layer Techniques
By reducing the distance between legitimate transceiver pair or by increasing the
transmission power, we can reduce the jamming-to-signal ratio and make the link
more robust to jamming attacks.
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Directional Antennas
Jamming interference coming from directions other than the direction of trans-
mission does not stimulate transmission deferrals due to carrier sensing. [31]
Spread Spectrum
The most well known techniques are based on the use of Spread Spectrum com-
munications. Here signal processing techniques used as jamming countermea-
sures. [32]
Cyber Mines and FEC (Forward Error Correction)
Low energy long-lived jamming units are called cyber-mines. For handing these
there are some methods like Low Density Parity Codes (LDPC) and Turbo-Codes
etc. [33,34]
Use of covert channels in the presence of a jammer
When the reception of a packet is affected by jammer, the receiver can identify
the reception of a (corrupted) packet. By encoding data based on the inter-arrival
times between received corrupted packets, a low rate channel under jamming can
be established. [35, 36]
3.4.3 Security Services
The main security requirements are Integrity ,Authenticity and Confidentiality.
Integrity
Integrity means that data cannot be modified undetectably. In our proposed
method, the MITM attacker is not able to launch the attack because we are using
IDS and IPS methods to detect and prevent the attacker. So we can say that,
Integrity exists.
Authenticity
Authenticity is the process of validation whether the two parties which are commu-
nicating are genuine or not. In our proposed method, we are using Diffie/Hellman
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key exchange in second stage of SSP process and also there are two authentication
stages. So we can say that, the authenticity exists.
Confidentiality
Confidentiality is the term used to prevent the disclosure of information to unau-
thorized individuals or systems. In our proposed method, we are encrypting the
message or data which is going to be transfered with a link key which will be
known to only the communicating parties. Even though some one can intercept,
but he can not decode. So we can say that, the confidentiality exists.
3.4.4 Simulation Details
BlueCove [37] is a Java library for Bluetooth (JSR-82 implementation) that cur-
rently interfaces with the Mac OS X, WIDCOMM, BlueSoleil and Microsoft Blue-
tooth stack found in Windows XP SP2 or Windows Vista and WIDCOMM and
Microsoft Bluetooth stack on Windows Mobile. BlueCove-GPL is additional GPL
licensed module to support BlueCove runtime on Linux BlueZ. BlueCove JSR-82
Emulator module is additional module for BlueCove to simulate Bluetooth stack.
BlueCove can be used in Java 2 Platform, Standard Edition (J2SE) 1.1 or newer.
bluecove-emu is additional module for BlueCove to simulate Bluetooth stack.
bluecove-emu is a pure Java implementation of JSR-82 without Bluetooth hard-
ware. Fully tested using TCK JSR-82 TCK test results.
3.4.5 Results & Discussions
Java is a secure programming language, so it is not feasible to create adversary
node using java. To do that we need an additional hardware support. So we have
simulated the proposed countermeasure partially. The simulation of successful
Secure Simple Pairing method is shown in Figures 3.2 and 3.3. The Figure 3.2
is the non-initiating device’s execution and Figure 3.3 is the initiating devices
execution. The simulation of unsuccessful Secure Simple Pairing method is shown
in Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.2: Simulation of Server Side Screen Shot for a Successful SSP connection
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Figure 3.3: Simulation of Client Side Screen Shot for a Successful SSP connection
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Figure 3.4: Simulation of Screen Shot for an Unsuccessful SSP connection
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3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have seen all kinds of the countermeasures for the threats and
attacks which are discussed on Chapter-2 and also proposed a countermeasure to
avoid the MITM attack when the both communicating parties are known to each
other.
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Chapter 4
Conclusion
4.1 Achievements and Limitations of the Work
In this thesis, we have shown the MITM attack that is very harmful in Bluetooth
pairing. Our proposal includes the support of IDS and IPS to protect against
MITM attacks which was never been used in Bluetooth pairing till date. We have
shown the simulation screen shots of the unsuccessful and successful SSP when
there is no attacker. We have partially implemented the proposed countermeasure
as there are no devices with adjustable BD ADDRs. Except sophisticated and
expensive protocol analyzers, no one can perform the MITM attacks. In near
future, If the adjustable BT ADDR devices are available, our proposal will defend
and withstand the attackers against the attack.
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